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Introduction: The Controversy over Turkish Secularism 
 
Turkey is widely considered to be a pioneering example of a secular state in a Muslim-
majority nation. According to Ernest Gellner, for example, who could be counted among 
the “orientalists” writing on Muslim society along with Bernard Lewis and Samuel 
Huntington, Islam is an exception among religions because it cannot be secularized and 
Turkey is “the exception within the exception” (Gellner, 1997, p.236). Because of the 
political/ideological significance of this seemingly unlikely combination of Islam and 
secularism, much controversy and myth-making have accompanied scholarly analyses 
of the Turkish experience. Whether as an expression of appreciation or regret, there has 
nevertheless been a general agreement around the view that Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) 
and his associates, i.e., the Kemalist leadership of the Republic of Turkey, embarked on 
a course of state-led, top-down modernization and secularization that aimed to 
transform this Muslim nation into a Westernized, secular entity, albeit with only limited 
success.  
A new generation of scholars, however, have been producing a growing literature that 
challenges and complicates this received wisdom. Ceren Lord (2018, p.xi), for example, 
building on Deniz Kandiyoti’s (2012) critical description of the “master narrative” of 
Turkish history, notes that “many previous studies adopted a binary framework of 
analysis in which Turkish history was narrated as being marked by a confrontation 
between an authoritarian secular Kemalist state and a Muslim society,” and goes on to 
argue that this framework led many to welcome the rise of the Justice and Development 
Party (AKP) to power as a process of democratization. In addition to a series of works 
that question the assumptions of this “master narrative” (e.g., Azak, 2010; Akan, 2017; 
Lord, 2018), there is also a set of recent writings (e.g., Adak, 2015; Tombuş and Aygenç, 
2017; Mutluer, 2018; Öztürk, 2018) that address state-religion relations in Turkey in the 
light of the AKP experience and critically note the central role, under AKP rule, of what 
has always been described as the backbone of state secularism, the Directorate of 
Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, DIB). Building on this literature, as well as 
my own previous work, I offer in this report a critique of the received wisdom and 
question whether Turkey’s model of state-religion relations has really ever been an 
example of secularism, let alone “oppressive” (Yavuz, 2003) or “assertive” (Kuru, 2007) 
secularism.  
A succinct articulation of the received wisdom on Turkish secularism may be found in 
Tariq Modood and Thomas Sealy (2019, p.10), who speak of “Ataturk’s Turkey, which 
sought to control and utilise religion; through, for example, the Diyanet (Directorate of 
Religious Affairs).” But this account is misleading on several counts. The institutions that 
are held responsible for “controlling” or “regulating” religion in Turkey, such as the DIB, 
were not invented by Kemal Atatürk himself or the Kemalist leadership of the modern 
state, but inherited from the Ottoman Empire and then transformed to a certain extent. 
Thus, first, if the Kemalist state is to be considered secular because of these institutions, 
then by definition the Ottoman Empire ought to be considered secular as well. Second, 
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the Kemalist leadership in fact restructured these institutions in order to separate 
religion from the state, but did not (or could not) go far enough. An implicit element of 
the received wisdom is that Islam was suppressed by the Kemalist regime, a “grievance” 
frequently expressed by Islamist circles. This too is false, as the regime’s intention was 
not to suppress religion or religiosity per se, but to prevent the manipulation of religion 
for political ends. Here again the regime was unsuccessful. The Kemalist project of 
separation was never accomplished, but remained as an object of contestation 
throughout Turkish political history. Finally, if by “utilization of religion” is meant the 
political mobilization of the masses through religious language, this is something that 
would be done more by those political forces or movements that are closer to Islamism 
than to secularism, and that has indeed been the case in Turkish political history. For the 
Kemalists, a proper separation between religion and the state had to include a 
separation between religion and politics. This was partly justified on grounds of freeing 
state affairs from religious influence and partly based on a concern about the danger of 
debasing religion by instrumentalizing it for political ends. Both of these are relevant 
concerns for a politics of secularism and their veracity has indeed been borne out by the 
recent AKP experience.  
In order to elaborate on these points in this essay, I first aim to show in the next two 
sections that religion has always had a central role in the Turkish state (a) in defining 
the core of the nation and (b) bureaucratically occupying part of the state structure. The 
possibility of instituting an Islamist regime always existed due to this configuration, and 
the recent AKP experience served to demonstrate this potential, alarming not only the 
secularists (Kemalist or otherwise) but also the erstwhile supporters of the AKP who 
were liberal critics of Kemalism. The AKP’s efforts to institute an Islamist regime from 
above also alarmed a range of religious circles, because the use of state institutions to 
impose religiosity in effect turned pious people away from religion, a danger noted by 
Kemalists early on. 
 
Nation and Religion: Islam as the Defining Core of the Turkish Nation 
In early modern European state-building, cleansing of populations in order to create 
“national” homogeneity took place first along religious lines (Marx, 2003). By contrast, 
the Ottoman Empire (OE), although an Islamic empire, self-confidently contained 
diverse populations that were identified and organized on the basis of religion rather 
than ethnicity or language. A religious community (called “millet”) could include 
different ethnic and linguistic groups, and residents of different regions of the empire, 
and had some measure of political power and significance. While the Muslim population 
was at the top of the hierarchy, the imperial state nonetheless granted each millet some 
form of autonomy in their internal legal, judicial, as well cultural and educational affairs, 
and each was represented by a leader whose position was incorporated into the central 
administration of the empire (Braude and Lewis, 1982; Barkey, 2008).  
The issue of a homogeneous “national” identity in the OE only arose when the concept 
of equal citizenship was first introduced in the mid-nineteenth century. The effort to 
build a collective identity led to the notion of Ottomanism – a premature and ultimately 
unsuccessful attempt to create a proto-secular nationalist ideology. The notion of 
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Ottomanism represented an attempt to imagine a unified territorial identity for the 
internally diverse empire. It was created in an effort to retain the loyalty of non-Muslims 
and combat the separatist movements that had appeared in the Balkans, by building 
equal citizenship irrespective of religion (Kayalı, 1997). Regardless, the empire 
continued to be dismembered throughout the late nineteenth century and, in constant 
warfare during its last decades, lost much of its Balkan territories, which were populated 
mostly by Christian subjects and whose Muslim occupants migrated to Anatolia. 
Alternative ideologies competing with Ottomanism were Islamism and “Turkism” 
(Akçura, 1904). Particularly during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamit II (1876-1909), 
Islamism became more prominent as state ideology, although Ottomanism was not 
officially abandoned until World War I. Finally, the failure of Ottomanism initiated a 
policy of primarily religious purification of what would eventually become Turkey, 
although it was legitimized as Turkish nationalism. The Armenian population was 
subjected to forced migration, conversion and massacre during the War (Akçam, 2004). 
Further purging of Christians took place with the population exchange between Turkey 
and Greece in the 1920s, which was on the basis of religion rather than language: 
Turkish-speaking Orthodox Christians of Anatolia were exchanged for Greek-speaking 
Muslims (Hirschon, 2003).  
During the nineteenth century, as new norms of equal citizenship were being instituted 
in the OE, the term “millet” had begun to acquire its current meaning in the Turkish 
language, i.e., “nation” (Karpat, 1982). Although the millet system was significantly 
circumscribed in the last decades of the OE and it formally disappeared with the creation 
of the Turkish Republic, there are still remnants of it both in the formal structures of the 
state and in popular notions of nationhood. Indeed, as a legacy of the millet system, both 
Turkey and the post-Ottoman nation-states in the Balkans pursued nation-building 
through religious homogeneity (Todorova, 1996).  
Modood and Sealy (2019, p.9) characterize Gandhi as “the first nationalist to mobilise 
masses through a religion,” and Pakistan as “the first modern state based on a religious 
identity.” In both regards, however, the Turkish experience is historically prior to these 
cases. In 1920, during the Turkish War of Liberation, Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) referred 
to the people of Anatolia not as Turks but as a mosaic of ethnicities united by Islam. 
Addressing the National Assembly, he declared “[the members of this Assembly] are not 
just Turk or Circassian, Kurd or Laz. They are composed of all the Islamic elements and 
constitute a coherent whole.” (Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü, 1990, p.74). The Turkish 
nation was indeed created by the expulsion of non-Muslims from the territory defined 
as Turkey, and the remaining small populations of non-Muslim communities were given 
“minority” status and brought under protection (and granted some small measure of 
autonomy) by the Lausanne Treaty, signed on 24 July 1923, which secured Turkey’s 
independence and laid the foundation for the declaration of the Turkish Republic on 29 
October 1923. Turkish republican nationalism thus had mutually contradictory sources, 
inherited from the Ottoman period. It unsuccessfully attempted to synthesize Islamism, 
Turkism and territorial nationalism, though as a legacy of the Ottoman millet system, 
religion retained its centrality in Turkish national identity (Kirişçi, 2000; Cagaptay, 
2006). Kurds, for example, as non-Turkish speaking Muslims, were considered capable 
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of assimilation into the Turkish nation, but non-Muslims were always assumed to be 
inassimilable and fundamentally alien. The hope and expectation were that they would 
leave the country, as they indeed did during political crises involving coordinated 
attacks on their lives and property in the 1940s, 1950s and early 1960s (Yannas, 2007). 
Therefore, during the republican era, as well, the remaining Christian populations of 
Anatolia (Armenians, Greeks, and the often-forgotten minority of Syriacs) were forced 
to leave in successive waves.  
In short, minority and non-Muslim have been (and still are) identical in Turkish national 
consciousness: a non-Muslim citizen of Turkey is not considered a “Turk.” Non-Muslims 
remain as “step-citizens” of the Republic, with significantly curtailed citizenship rights 
(Ekmekcioglu, 2014). In a law passed in 1926, and still de facto in practice despite its 
repeal in 1965, positions in high bureaucracy and the military are effectively closed to 
non-Muslim citizens. Indeed, the Islamic identity of the new Turkish state was evident 
in its first constitution, adopted by the National Assembly in April 1924. Article 1 defined 
the state as a Republic, and Article 2 defined the religion of the state as Islam. The clause 
that defined the religion of the state was removed in 1928 and subsequently replaced by 
a clause that defined the state as “secular” in 1937. While the characterization of the 
state as “secular” has remained in the constitution to this day, the same cannot be said 
about actual structure of the state and its policies, as we see in the following sections.  
In terms of both popular cultural assumptions and state policy, then, the Turkish nation 
is primarily imagined as a (Sunni) Muslim entity. This religious core of national identity 
seems to defy the secularism of the state, enshrined in the Constitution and uncritically 
accepted in established historiography. Unless declared and proven otherwise, every 
child born as a citizen in Turkey is registered as Muslim and this is indicated in their 
government-issued identity card. Moreover, there is a limit to the choice of religions that 
could legally be stated in an identity card – only those religions officially recognized by 
the state are acceptable, identifying oneself as “atheist” or even just leaving that box 
blank are not (albeit in practice there may be exceptions). “Muslim” is thus an identity 
conferred upon the Turkish people by the presumably “secular” state. Islamists 
especially delight in repeating at every opportunity that 99 percent of the people of 
Turkey are Muslim. But this nominal characterization does not reflect the demographic 
reality, for many of those listed as Muslim do not necessarily practice, and self-declared 
atheists may constitute up to 3 per cent of the population (Azak, 2018). A recent survey 
(conducted in May 2019) found that only 90 per cent believe in the existence and unity 
of God, and only 40 per cent say that they regularly perform their prayers, nearly 5 per 
cent believe in the existence of a Creator but not in any religion, and the remaining 5 per 
cent are either unsure or do not believe in the existence of a Creator (T24, 15 May 2019). 
As religious minorities are not counted in the official census, we only have estimates of 
their current variety and numbers. The 1965 census was the last one in which Muslims 
(albeit without any account of their division into sects) and officially recognized non-
Muslims (Jews, Greeks and Armenians) were counted. Despite some inconsistency 
between the provinces in their definitions and classifications, nation-wide surveys from 
1927 to 1965 nevertheless give us a sense of the decline in their numbers. The number 
of “Christians” in general declined from about 320,000 (2.4 per cent of the population) 
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in 1927 to about 207,000 (0.65 per cent) in 1965. The large decline is primarily due to 
the exodus of those Greeks that were initially exempted from the population exchange 
in the 1920s. The number of “Armenians” declined from about 78,000 in 1927 to 70,000 
in 1965, and the number of Jews from about 78,000 in 1927 to about 38,000 in 1965, as 
many migrated to Israel after that state’s creation. Also, the remaining minorities chose 
to move from their provincial locales to Istanbul, where they would feel safer. For the 
Armenians, the percentage of those living in Istanbul rose from 70 to 90 between 1927 
and 1965, and for the Jews from 60 to 80. Finally, the number of those belonging to all 
other non-Muslim religions, classified in the census as “other/unknown” declined from 
20,000 in 1927 to 15,000 in 1965 (Dündar, 2000, pp.55-64).  
Currently we have no official data, but a number of sources (ranging from the US State 
Department, Minority Rights Groups, and private companies that administer 
questionnaire surveys) offer estimates that vary widely. Still, in a total population of 
roughly 82 million, non-Muslims are in miniscule proportions. Armenians may be 
anywhere between 60,000 and 90,000, Greeks between 2,000 and 5,000, and Jews 
between 16,000 and 20,000. In addition, there may be 3,000 Chaldean Christians, 5,000 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, up to 7,000 members of Protestant denominations, 10,000 Bahais, 
15,000 Russian Orthodox (mostly composed of Russian immigrants), 25,000 Roman 
Catholics (again, composed of immigrants), and 25,000 Syriacs. There are also roughly 
3 million Shia Muslims. 
But the most significant religious minority in Turkey are the Alevis, that may be 
anywhere between 10 to 30 per cent of the population (i.e., roughly 10 to 25 million 
people). Considered a heretic sect by mainstream (Sunni) Muslim opinion, as well as by 
Sunni authorities within both the theological faculties of universities and the DIB, the 
Alevis themselves are divided between those who emphasize the syncretic nature of 
their faith and those who insist that they are part, or indeed the correct interpretation, 
of Islam. Regardless, whether under the Kemalist or the AKP regime of secularism, the 
demands of the variety of Alevis have been ignored, and they have been discriminated 
against or outright persecuted. The limits of Turkish secularism are most clearly 
revealed by the status and experience of the Alevis (Gülalp, 2013). 
 
State and Religion: The Institutional Framework in Historical Perspective 
Although the received wisdom in Turkish historiography takes the creation of the 
republic under Kemalist leadership as a break in the history of religious affairs, there are 
in fact significant continuities between the Ottoman and Republican periods in terms of 
political culture and state structure (Deringil, 1993a; Meeker, 2002; Gülalp, 2005; 
Bottoni, 2007). This is true whether we consider the secularization of society as a 
modernization process or the institution of secularism as a normative political principle. 
By the former, I mean the process whereby “the social significance of religion 
diminishes” through economic, social, and institutional differentiation and 
rationalization (Wallis and Bruce, 1992, pp.8-9), while the latter refers to the principle 
that aims to guarantee citizens the right to freedom of “conscience and religion” as 
spelled out in international human rights documents (Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, Article 18; European Convention on Human Rights, Article 9), which also includes 
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the freedom of “atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned” (ECtHR, Kokkinakis 
v. Greece, 14307/88, 25 May 1993, para.31). It is useful to distinguish between these 
two concepts, because both in the Ottoman Empire (OE) and the Turkish Republic, the 
secularization of the economy, social life, and institutions of the state proceeded to a 
greater extent than the establishment of secularism as a political principle, despite 
serious efforts in that direction. Or, using Jose Casanova’s (1994, p.6) terminology, while 
secularization as “differentiation and emancipation of the secular spheres from religious 
institutions and norms” started early and progressed considerably, secularization as 
“privatization,” although attempted, remained far behind, with occasional bouts of “de-
privatization” and even “de-differentiation.” This is evident from the above account of 
national identity, but also needs to be assessed with regard to the organization of the 
state, as we do in this section, and with regard to political struggles and fluctuations, in 
the sections to follow.  
The early modernizing and secularizing “reforms” of the OE began during the reign of 
Sultan Mahmut II (1808-1839), whose successor, Sultan Abdülmecit I (1839-1861), 
issued the Gülhane Rescript of 1839, starting the Tanzimat (Reorganization) period, 
culminating in the Constitution of 1876, which was proclaimed (but then quickly 
shelved) by Sultan Abdülhamit II (1876-1909). The Tanzimat reforms pointed toward 
the building of a modern state in place of the patrimonial empire that the OE was 
(Deringil, 1998, p.9). Drawing the outlines of a constitutional monarchy, the Tanzimat 
reforms introduced guarantees for the security of life, honor, and property, and 
protection from arbitrary actions of the state, as well as a fair system of taxation and a 
fair system of military conscription, to all subjects of the empire without regard to 
religion. The reforms would thus potentially bring the millet system to an end by making 
each individual, qua individual, equal before the law and independent of the communal 
hierarchy, thus turning imperial subjects into citizens. Although Abdülhamit II shelved 
the constitution almost as soon as he ascended the throne, he continued with the 
modernizing and secularizing reforms of the state, building a rational bureaucracy, 
expanding mass schooling, the postal service, railways, and so on, while at the same time 
he legitimized his power through Islamist ideology. He was an autocratic ruler and a 
fervent modernizer. Many of the bureaucratic institutions of Republican Turkey were 
founded during his reign. Abdülhamit was “implementing the concrete policy of a 
rational secular programme,” but he was doing so through the political language of Islam 
(Deringil, 1993b, pp.5-6).  
As the OE was integrated into global capitalism, the judicial system also had to be 
secularized. In the classical millet system, there was judicial plurality because Jews and 
Christians had their own courts outside of the Islamic justice system. Additionally, there 
was another parallel justice system applicable to foreign traders, which was arranged 
through “capitulations” granted to the governments of their home countries. In dealings 
with them, an impersonal and written (“Weberian”) legal system prevailed, as opposed 
to the “kadi justice” of Islamic law. As these capitulations began to cover non-Muslim 
Ottoman citizens as well, because foreign powers could also bring them under their 
protection in business dealings, Muslim traders fell into a disadvantage. Consequently, 
the state was forced to create a system of “secular and heavily western-influenced 
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commercial courts in Istanbul and Cairo in the 1850s” (Kuran, 2011, p.208). A similar 
secularization trend also prevailed in the education system in the mid-nineteenth 
century. The needs of the bureaucracy and the military to adapt to the pressures of 
modernization, trying to catch up with Western European states, necessitated the 
introduction of secular curricula and methods of education, which developed alongside 
the traditional religious education dominated by the Islamic ulema (Ortaylı, 1983).  
But these secularizing moves did not change the way that state-religion relations were 
organized in the OE. In Western/Christian societies, secularism is often conceptualized 
as a mode of relationship between church and state, i.e., between clerical and temporal 
authority, arranged in a variety of forms, such as strict separation, mutual autonomy, 
institutional cooperation, and so on. None of these concepts are relevant to the Ottoman-
Turkish experience, as clerical authority has never had a corporate existence 
independent of the state. In medieval Europe, the Catholic Church was the only 
bureaucratic power that was organized across the continent, with authority over local 
powers. The establishment of territorial political authority in early modern Europe 
necessarily involved a confrontation with the Catholic Church. The opposition of these 
local powers to the centralized structure of the Church fueled the Enlightenment ideas 
and the political revolutions against the clergy (Gay, 1966; Harris 1966). Consequently, 
the European nation-states either became secular or founded their own national 
churches. The religious establishment in the Ottoman Empire, by contrast, was 
incorporated into the state structure, dominated by the sultan. Although doctrinally 
there is no clerical hierarchy in Islam, as no intermediary should go between God and 
the faithful, there was just such a bureaucracy as part of the Ottoman state (İnalcık, 1989, 
pp.169-71). But this bureaucracy did not have any real independent power, because the 
sultan was also the Caliph, and the religious establishment only exercised authority in 
his name. The Şeyhülislam, as the head of the religious hierarchy, was the government’s 
chief jurist, whose advice the sultan would seek on legal and political matters, but he was 
directly appointed and deposed by the sultan (İnalcık, 1989, p.94).  
When Istanbul came under British occupation at the end of World War I, paralysing the 
Ottoman government, the nationalists led by Mustafa Kemal formed a parallel 
government in Ankara waging the Liberation War (1919-1922). In 1920, the Ankara 
government created the Ministry of Sharia and Pious Foundation in place of the office of 
the Şeyhülislam, which was based in occupied Istanbul. After the Liberation War was 
won and the Republic founded (1923), among the new institutions created in 1924 was 
the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DIB) attached to the prime ministry, which took the 
place of the Ministry of Sharia and Pious Foundations. DIB formally resembled the 
Ottoman institution of Şeyhülislam, insofar as each was part of the respective state 
structure. But the substantive difference between them illustrates the character of 
Kemalism’s project of “secularism.” While the Şeyhülislam would issue religious opinion 
regarding matters of state and law, war and peace, and so on, as the sultans formally 
sought their political and legal advice, the republican regime, attempting to turn faith 
solely into a private and personal matter, had restricted the role of DIB to issuing 
opinions on the daily affairs of the average believer.  
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Some argue that the Kemalist regime created the DIB specifically in order to dominate 
religious affairs and even suppress religiosity in society. According to Hakan Yavuz 
(2000, p.29), for example, “In order to subordinate religion to the political 
establishment, as was done in the Communist Eastern bloc, the new Kemalist Republic 
created its own version of Islam by establishing the Directorate of Religious Affairs” (see 
also Turam, 2007, p.42; Kadıoğlu, 2010, pp.492-3). But this interpretation is false. In fact, 
the creation of this institution had “liberal” origins, intended precisely to separate 
religion from politics. At the time that the law was passed, the government structure 
included both the chief of staff of the military and the head of the religious institution as 
members of the cabinet. Mustafa Kemal had already made clear his views on the role of 
the military in civilian politics (Volkan and Itzkowitz, 1984, pp.66-7). In a single bill of 
law, both of these seats were removed from the cabinet and reduced to the level of 
departments of the prime ministry, on grounds that neither military nor religious affairs 
leaders should be involved in politics or political decision-making (Genç, 2005). This is 
how Mustafa Kemal spoke to the National Assembly about the bill: “Honorable members! 
The principle of keeping the army separate from the general life of the country is a point 
which the Republic always regards as fundamental… Along the same lines, … it is 
indispensable to liberate the religion of Islam, within which we have been living 
peacefully and happily with devotion, from the customary ways in which it has been a 
means of politics” (quoted in Akan, 2017, p.139). 
Moreover, as a result of the parliamentary debate on what to call this department’s 
affairs, the term “religion” (din), which was in the original proposal, was found 
inappropriate and the decision was made to call it “piety” (diyanet). The correct English-
language rendering of the name of this directorate is therefore “affairs of the pious,” 
rather than “affairs of religion” (or religious affairs) as is customary. The difference is 
significant, for the objectives of the department were described in terms of helping pious 
citizens with questions about their private affairs regarding religious practice and no 
more than that. The intention was indeed the privatization of religion and its separation 
from politics.  
The privatization of religion was not a new idea. An early precedent existed in a 
statement attributed to Sultan Mahmut II (1808-1839). In a discussion of the concept of 
Ottomanism, Akçura (1904, p.20) notes that the Sultan famously said that he wishes to 
see religious differences between his subjects only when they have entered their 
mosques, synagogues and churches. While this ideal of “privatization,” precisely 
imagined in order to create equal citizenship, continued to exist as an ideal, it was never 
successfully achieved, even during the Republican period. In 1927, Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk delivered a speech in the National Assembly that lasted several days, in which 
he gave a detailed account of the national struggle and the first years of the republic, 
indicating accomplishments and failures. This speech, which has been published in 
English (as The Speech) and other languages, has been treated as the authoritative 
history of the creation of the republic. Needless to say, this account reflected his own 
point of view and many of its details were disputed by other political actors of the period. 
But what concerns us here is his conception of secularism as stated in the speech: “A 
government that has various religious communities among its citizens and is 
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responsible for treating individuals from every religion in a just and equitable manner, 
and for providing justice in its courts equally to subjects and foreigners alike, is obligated 
to respect the freedom of religion and thought.” (Atatürk, 1927, p.523). He goes on to 
indicate that secularism meant bringing sovereignty down from the heavens to the 
people and that those who pursued politics by reference to religion were opposed to 
both popular sovereignty and the freedom of religion.  
During the early years of the Republic, the government under Mustafa Kemal’s 
leadership continued with the measures started in the Ottoman period to further 
rationalize and secularize the legal, judicial and educational systems. The dual structures 
in the form of parallel Islamic and secular institutions, still in existence as inherited by 
the Republic, were finally eliminated and unified. The Law of Unification of Education 
was passed in March 1924, on the same day that the DIB was created. All religious 
schools run by the defunct Ministry of Sharia were closed and responsibility for all 
education, including the religious, was transferred to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of 
Education. A month later, in April, Islamic courts were closed and the judicial system 
was unified under the Ministry of Justice. But this unification did not mean that the legal 
system was unified. Religious laws continued to exist along with the secular. In 1926, a 
set of new laws were passed, which were mostly adopted from European codes taken as 
models. The most important of these for our purposes was the Civil Code, which replaced 
the Islamic family and personal status law. In the preparatory stage before the passing 
of this law, the leaders of the non-Muslim communities were invited (some would say, 
pressured) to relinquish their right to have their own family laws granted to them by the 
Lausanne Treaty, which they did, so that when the law was adopted it became 
universally valid for all citizens (Oran, 2003).  
Usually counted among the Kemalist regime’s “secularizing” measures is the abolition of 
the Caliphate, which incidentally took place on the same day as the creation of the DIB 
and hence considered to be somehow related to it, as if one institution took the place of 
the other. But as we saw, DIB took the place of the Ministry of Sharia, which in turn had 
taken the place of the Ottoman office of the Şeyhülislam. The abolition of the Caliphate 
was an altogether different matter. When the nationalist struggle ended in victory in the 
fall of 1922, European powers invited both the Ottoman government based in occupied 
Istanbul and the nationalist government based in Ankara to commence peace talks at 
Lausanne. In response, the National Assembly in Ankara met on 1 November 1922 to 
separate the Caliphate from the Sultanate and to abolish the Sultanate, in effect 
dissolving the Ottoman Empire for good. The Ottoman sultan at the time, Vahdettin, then 
sought refuge with the British and fled the country, and his cousin Abdülmecit II was 
named the new Caliph by the National Assembly. Two years later, in 1924, the newly 
declared Republic, passed a law that abolished the seat of the Caliphate occupied by 
Abdülmecit II, with the justification that the caliphate is intrinsic to the meaning and 
concept of government and republic, and therefore cannot exist as a distinct center of 
power (Genç, 2005, p.35). The same law banished the Ottoman dynasty from Turkey, 
sending Abdülmecit and his family into exile.  
Paradoxically, however, these measures did not involve the building of secularism in 
accordance with the normative principles of equality and freedom. Islamic influence was 
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presumably removed from political and public affairs, but Islam still remained as part of 
the state establishment and identity. Herein lay the contradiction of the Kemalist project. 
As Kandiyoti (2012, p.516) remarks, “the blows that Kemalism dealt to the symbols and 
institutions of Islam … must not be conflated or confused with a transition to a civic 
concept of citizenship that positions the state in an equidistant relationship to all its 
ethnically and religiously diverse citizenry.” The question is: how do we account for this? 
 
Secularization of Social Life vs. Political Secularism 
We have already noted that, as no religious organization such as the Catholic Church 
existed independent of the state, a concept like “mutual autonomy” would not be 
applicable. Unlike in France, for example, the Kemalists did not have to struggle against, 
or reach a mode of accommodation with, the clergy per se, because the clergy was 
already in the employ of the state. But one could perhaps imagine “mutual autonomy” 
between state and religion in a slightly different way and conceive of it in terms of the 
state leaving religious organization to the forces of civil society without any direct 
intervention or regulation, and abandoning precisely those actions that the state has 
assumed, such as licensing mosques and putting the clergy on government payroll, and 
so on. This would obviously be preferable, because, after all, the (Sunni) Muslim clergy’s 
salary comes out of the taxes of all citizens, whether Muslim or not, or whether religious 
or not. Could (or should) not the Kemalists have gone further and completely separate 
state and religion in this sense, and relieve itself and the non-Muslim and non-religious 
citizens of the burden?  
Perhaps they could, except that they tended to see unchecked religious associations as a 
political threat or, worse, as simply dangerous, given the “ignorance” of the illiterate and 
uneducated masses. The way they saw it, their struggle was not against the clergy, but 
precisely against those “civil society” forces that might use the religious sentiments of 
the masses to politically undermine the regime (i.e., the republic). In this struggle, they 
saw the clergy on their side, as the project was not to suppress Islam, as has sometimes 
been claimed, but to build what they considered a “proper” and “enlightened” 
conception of Islam (Azak, 2010). The division that has historically existed between 
secularists and Islamists in Turkey, then, has not been between lay political leaders and 
the clergy, but between the secularists and Islamists that could be found both within the 
clergy and among the political leaders. 
The “proper” Islam imagined by the Kemalists was free of the elements of “folk” Islam, 
such as “superstitious” beliefs and local “sheiks” who could manipulate the religiosity of 
the masses. Efforts to propagate “proper” Islam included publishing the Turkish-
language translation of the Qur’an, so that the believer could find out what was in it for 
him/herself. This particular effort in fact started through private initiative before it was 
undertaken as a state project, and the government only got involved when the initial 
translations were seen to be of poor quality (Wilson, 2009). That Islamists objected to 
this endeavor to make the Qur’an accessible was further evidence for the Kemalists of 
the intention to keep pious people in the dark in order to exploit their religious 
sentiments.  
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1925 was a critical year for the Kemalist regime, when it was challenged by a serious 
uprising in the Kurdish-populated southeast, led by Sheikh Said, an influential and 
revered head of the Naqshbandi order. Said publicly condemned the Kemalist regime for 
destroying religion and incited rebellion to end the “blasphemy.” Researchers note that 
although the objective was to create an independent Kurdistan, or at least gain some 
form of autonomy, religious language was used to motivate followers into rebellion 
(Bruinessen, 1978; Tunçay, 1981; Olson, 1989). In addition, the British had a 
longstanding interest and involvement in Kurdish nationalism, and although there was 
no direct evidence of British involvement in the Sheikh Said rebellion, as far as the 
Kemalists were concerned, the Kurds were in alliance with the British and were serving 
a sinister imperialist plan to divide up the country which the nationalists had fought so 
hard to save from occupation (Tunçay, 1981, pp.130-1; Olson, 1989, pp.124-33). The 
rebellion broke out in February; Said was captured and executed in April. The incident 
led the regime to envisage an intimate connection between the Kurdish and Islamic 
threats to its own stability, and prompted it to accelerate its move towards further 
emphasis on secularization and Turkish nationalism.  
In March 1925, soon after the beginning of the rebellion, the Law for the Maintenance of 
Order (Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu) was passed, giving the government extraordinary 
powers. In June 1925 the regime closed down the opposition party in the parliament, the 
Progressive Republican Party, because of its alleged Islamist leanings (Ahmad, 1993, 
pp.57-60). In November 1925, the Law for Dervish Lodges (Tekke ve Zaviyeler Kanunu) 
was passed, banning sufi brotherhoods and other grassroots religious groupings, 
because they were seen by the regime as potential sources of political trouble. In March 
1926, a new Penal Code was adopted, including an article that banned “the utilization of 
religion or religious sentiment or things considered sacred by religion for inciting people 
to violate the security of the state or to form associations to this effect” and “the founding 
of political associations based on religious ideas and sentiments.” The same code also 
included several articles protecting the “freedom of religion,” by banning any 
publications “denigrating any of the religions recognized by the state” and any acts “that 
prevented religious worship” or “damaged religious sites or objects.” 
The Law for the Maintenance of Order remained in effect until 1929. Along with the 
introduction of the Civil Code and the Penal Code, the infamous “Hat Law,” often 
associated with the regime’s “secularizing” efforts, was introduced in this period, 
although its link with secularism or secularization is not clear, except that most of the 
opposition to it originated from Islamic circles and was based on the complaint that the 
rim of the fedora hat, mandated by this law to replace the use of the fez, was unsuitable 
for Muslim prayer, as if it could not be removed along with the shoes during the prayer. 
While one may debate whether implementing dress codes is a useful or even meaningful 
practice, one must also note that they have existed throughout history in all societies. 
Moreover, headgear regulation had a precedent in Ottoman history. In the classical 
regime, “clothes, and particularly headgear, were important markers of ethnic, religious, 
and other communal identities as well as of social class and rank” (Yılmaz, 2013, pp.22-
3). Sultan Mahmut II had proclaimed the fez, an inauthentic item, as the national 
headgear to represent the equality of Ottoman citizens before the state through a 
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uniform appearance (Bottoni, 2007, p.181). The objective of the Hat Law was the same; 
but it also expressed the desire to simulate the outward appearance of what at the time 
was considered to be “civilized,” considering that the Europeans associated the fez with 
Ottoman tradition and backwardness (Yılmaz, 2013, p.29). No dress code was 
promulgated for women, but those who were using the face veil and çarşaf (similar to 
the Iranian chador) were encouraged to remove them and wear headscarves and 
overcoats instead. For the regime, this was a step in the legal and political emancipation 
of Turkish women; more steps would be taken later. Removing the face veil was 
necessary for women’s active presence and participation in the public sphere (Adak, 
2014). Yet another novelty introduced in this time frame was the Latin alphabet in place 
of the Arabic script used to write Turkish during the Ottoman Empire.  
These measures have often been described as top-down impositions rejected by society. 
In the portrayal of the “master narrative” alluded to before, “the religious sphere was 
particularly subject to constraint and repression by the authoritarian Kemalist regime,” 
with this view “being particularly pronounced among authors of Muslim sensibility” 
(Clayer, 2015, p.98). But, in fact, these measures, which could indeed be described as 
“secularizing” social life, were not planned and imposed as a blueprint, but arrived at in 
“a changing context both within Turkey and abroad” (ibid., pp.119-20). Anti-veiling 
campaigns, for example, “were shaped by discussions, negotiations and concessions at 
the local level” (Adak, 2014, p.60). Often local elites, such as newspaper writers and 
editors, prominent members of local associations, professional organizations, and so on, 
rather than state administrators, took the lead in these campaigns. Women themselves, 
who wanted to take their place in society as equal to men, were also active in anti-veiling 
efforts (ibid., pp.66-77). In fact, most of these “novelties” were not that novel at all, as 
they had origins in the Ottoman times, but also the collapse of the Empire and the 
nationalist rejuvenation created “a social and psychological environment conducive” to 
the institution of a new regime (Yılmaz, 2013, p.13). Therefore, many of these measures 
met with mixed reactions, giving “a much more complicated picture than either total 
compliance or total resistance,” and particularly “Westernized local elites found many of 
the state-promoted reforms and lifestyles acceptable and even desirable” (ibid., p.74 and 
p.105). It was likewise with the alphabet “reform,” in that the “transformation to the new 
alphabet was in fact more gradual and the government policy toward noncompliance 
more accommodating than has often been assumed in the literature” (ibid., p.178).  
The regime felt securely established by the end of the “Maintenance of Order” period in 
1929, but experienced a shock in late 1930, leading to a turn toward a new policy. In that 
year, the project of instituting a multi-party democracy by (re-)creating an opposition 
party to the ruling Republican People’s Party (RPP), founded by Mustafa Kemal in 1923, 
ended almost as soon as it began. The Free Republican Party was founded by a trusted 
associate of Mustafa Kemal, but was dissolved by the founder himself within three 
months of its existence, because the opposition that gathered around this party, mostly 
motivated by the economic crisis of 1929 due to the global depression, was much bigger 
than anticipated, posing a real challenge to the ruling RPP, and seemed (or was alleged 
by the government) to also include Islamist adversaries of the regime (Emrence, 2000). 
A bigger trauma than this for the regime, however, was an incidence of violence that took 
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place later in the year, all the more shocking because it took place in a district of a coastal 
city in the west, where secularization was supposed to have taken firmer hold. A mob, 
marching through town, chanting and calling for the reinstitution of the caliphate and 
sharia, attacked and killed two local guards and a reserve officer who arrived at the 
scene to maintain order. They then beheaded the young officer and paraded through the 
streets to the applause of bystanders. The government reacted by declaring martial law 
in the area and sentencing numerous rioters to the death penalty (Brockett, 1998, pp.54-
6).  
These incidents, perceived as threatening to the regime, caused a change in the 
government’s orientation, which could be observed in its policies regarding the place of 
religion in social life. The holy month of Ramadan was always an occasion for festivities 
during the Ottoman Empire, in which the government took part and played an important 
role in organizing. This continued in the first years of the Republic, even in 1925, when 
the Sheik Said rebellion took place. There was, in other words, a clear separation for the 
Kemalist regime between the place that religion had (or ought to have) in social life and 
that in politics. During the “Maintenance of Order” years, there was a decline in the 
government’s enthusiasm for these celebrations, but the real change came after 1931 
(Adak, 2010). There was a considerable effort in these years to shift the orientation for 
defining national identity from Islam to Turkishness. The Association for the Study of 
Turkish History and the Association for the Study of Turkish Language were founded by 
the government, in 1931 and 1932 respectively, and each developed ideologically 
extreme theories that were later discarded, such as the “Turkish History Thesis,” which 
claimed that Turks moving out of their original habitat in Central Asia spread their 
civilization to the rest of the world, including Anatolia, whose inhabitants, such as the 
Hittites and Sumerians, were therefore of Turkish origin, thus combining a racial 
definition of the modern Turkish nation with a territorial one, and the “Sun-Language 
Theory,” which claimed that all languages of the world derived from the original one 
spoken by Central Asian Turks. National holidays, marking historical events of the 
national struggle, were promulgated by law in 1935 and began to acquire greater 
significance and more enthusiastic state-organized celebrations than religious holidays. 
Finally, in 1937, “laiklik” (secularism) entered the Constitution as a defining feature of 
the Republic of Turkey.  
The Turkish History Thesis and the Sun Language Theory never took hold as convincing 
accounts of the identity of the Turkish nation, although remnants of some elements of 
these theories may still be found in the ideological accounts of nationalist extremists. In 
the end, by the time that Atatürk died in 1938, and his close associate İsmet İnönü took 
over as President and head of the RPP, the national identity was still Muslim and 
appealing to that identity was still an effective method of winning political support. 
Besides, racist definitions of the nation were to fall into disrepute with the end of WWII, 
which Turkey wisely managed to stay out of. Through all this, moreover, the religious 
bureaucracy (DIB) remained as part of the state structure. Complete separation never 
took place, although the significance of the DIB declined through the 1930s. Its budget 
and functions were already limited as it was primarily concerned with the 
administration of mosques and their personnel, with further limitation in 1931, when 
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this particular function was transferred to the Directorate of Pious Foundations, also 
part of the government bureaucracy. The DIB was then only directly responsible for the 
appointment of local muftis (Islamic scholars). But this decline phase did not last very 
long. At the end of WWII, only several years after secularism entered the Turkish 
Constitution, state policies on religion experienced yet another shift, this time in the 
opposite direction.  
 
Policies, Politics, and Current Trends 
The end of the World War opened a new chapter for Turkey in many ways. Recruited by 
the U.S. for the anti-Soviet front in the Cold War, the RPP government was encouraged, 
or perhaps pressured, to introduce multi-party democracy and expand the 
infrastructure for religion. Turkey was included in the Marshall Plan, although it had not 
participated in the World War, and was soon to become a member of NATO, after 
sending troops to distant Korea. In the context of the Cold War, Turkey’s religious 
identity would be a useful ideology to reinforce national solidarity against the “foreign” 
influences of socialism and communism. The ruling RPP and the Democrat Party (DP), 
the most important among those parties formed in the immediate post-War period, were 
in full agreement on this policy of placing greater emphasis on Turkey’s religious 
identity (Akan, 2017, pp.12-4, 137-8, 144-56). The DP was an offshoot of the RPP, 
seriously challenged it in the first multi-party elections of 1946, and brought it down 
from office in the 1950 elections. Already before the DP’s ascent to power, and partly 
under the pressure of competition from the DP, the RPP government took steps between 
1946 and 1950 to widen the space for religion. The administration of all mosques was 
returned to the DIB, and its size and budget were increased. A number of Imam-Hatip 
Schools were opened, designed to train preachers and prayer leaders employed by the 
DIB, along with a Faculty of Theology at Ankara University.  
Despite these moves, the DP won the 1950 elections. Its active presence in political 
competition and in power, however, revealed the nuance between the Kemalists and the 
Islamists in terms of the exact place each would assign to religion in public and political 
life. The anthropologist Paul Stirling, speaking about local politics in the village that he 
was studying at the end of the 1940s, right before the 1950 elections that brought the 
DP to power, notes the following: “I remember a Democrat Party man … [who] came to 
the village propagandizing. He actually went to the mosque and they all went with him, 
so that he actually did his prayers in front of the village and showed that he was a good 
Muslim. The Republican People’s Party didn’t do that” (Shankland, 1999, p.23). This type 
of behavior of the DP politicians was criticized by the leaders of the RPP while they were 
in opposition, including by İnönü, Atatürk’s successor as president, who underlined the 
distinction between “the exploitation of religion” and the “religiosity of the citizens” 
(Azak, 2010, p.130). Reminiscent of Edgar Morin’s concept of “catholaicité” to define the 
fusion of Catholicism and laicité in present-day France, the anthropologist Michael 
Meeker (2002, pp.52-53) uses the term “Kemalo-Islamism” to describe the activities of 
local RPP politicians in the village that he studied in the 1960s: “They would extol the 
radical secularist policies of the RPP in the midst of a coffeehouse discussion, then 
suddenly excuse themselves to perform their ablutions and prayers… Echoing official 
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RPP policy of the day, they condemned the JP and its predecessor, the DP, for injecting 
religion into politics, even as they took care to display their religious piety.” This 
behavior, in fact, reflected the Kemalist position of separating religion from politics, 
implying that one could be both Muslim and secular at the same time.  
There has been, and there still continues to be, a debate (or struggle) on the proper place 
of religion in public and political life, where the outcome is determined by the relative 
room for maneuver that the politically powerful group may have. But, while the room 
for religious expression in the public sphere has been subject to political fluctuations, 
the institutional setup has remained the same, with a trend toward the expansion of the 
religious infrastructure. The Kemalists were critical of the DP’s use of religion in political 
discourse, but also wary of an institutional design that would leave religious affairs to 
the forces of civil society, and hence still in favor of keeping the DIB within the state 
structure. Despite some debate and discussion in the writing of the 1961 Constitution, 
after the military coup of 1960 that overthrew the DP government, the DIB actually 
found its way into the constitution for the first time. The expansion of this infrastructure 
reached a new threshold with the 1980 coup. While only a brief mention of the DIB may 
be found in the 1961 Constitution, Article 136 of the 1982 Constitution assigned a 
specific role to it, in a formulation that is internally contradictory: “The Presidency of 
Religious Affairs … shall exercise its duties … in accordance with the principles of 
secularism, … aiming at national solidarity and integrity.” In another internal 
contradiction, Article 24 of the same Constitution made instruction in “religious culture 
and morals” compulsory in primary and secondary schools, while at the same time 
declaring the “freedom of conscience, religious belief and conviction.” In short, national 
solidarity and integrity were important goals for the military as a bulwark against 
socialist and communist ideologies, and Islam was found to be a convenient identity to 
unite around (Akan, 2017, pp.135-6, 196-9). Thus, with the adoption of the so-called 
“Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” (Çetinsaya, 1999) as official ideology by the military and the 
further expansion of the religious infrastructure within the state, Islamist movements 
found unprecedented fertile ground for political mobilization.  
Superficially it appears as if, as Ernest Gellner (1994, pp.199-200) states in accordance 
with the received wisdom, that the military, regarded by all as the guardian of Kemalism, 
does not seem to hesitate to step in every time a democratic election results in Islamist 
victory. A closer inspection, however, reveals that “many crucial moments where the 
institutional preferences of the Kemalist CHP [RPP], intellectuals, or the military came 
from an explicit pursuit of the political end of mobilizing religion (as the cement of 
society) against left movements and had nothing to do with the common perception that 
the ‘threat of Islam’ requires a strategy of containment” (Akan, 2017, p.207). It is safe to 
say, therefore, that of the “control and utilize” model, which was perhaps more valid for 
the post-WWII Turkey than pre-WWII, the emphasis was on “utilize” more than 
“control”; and better “utilization” of religion was indeed made by governments with an 
Islamist bent, starting with the DP and following on with its successors, all the way to 
the currently ruling AKP.  
The end of the Cold War created a temporary confusion and setback for the expanding 
Islamic influence. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the conservative 
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government in power took the opportunity to lift both the ban on “communist” 
organizations in the Penal Code and the ban, put in place back in 1926, on political 
organizations “based on religious ideas and sentiments.” This opening allowed greater 
room for Islamist mobilization at a time when the “communist threat” had already 
ceased. But, soon, Turkey’s geo-strategic position as a member of NATO led to a new 
form of assignment. In 1995, NATO formally shifted its attention from the now-extinct 
Soviet bloc to the rise of Islamist movements around the world, with Turkey as the 
“centerpiece” of U.S. policy and pursuit of interests in the MENA region. Now that the 
communist threat was replaced by the threat of Islamic “fundamentalism,” Turkey was 
urged by NATO (and the Western community of nations more generally) to take a firmer 
position domestically to prevent the development of Islamist politics (Gülalp, 1996). 
This configuration, combined with the electoral successes of the Islamist Welfare Party, 
resulted in yet another military intervention in 1997, which, by contrast to the 1980 
coup, imposed limitations on religious expression in the public sphere. The Welfare-led 
coalition government was forced to resign, and in the following year the Constitutional 
Court ruled for the closure of this party for violating the principle of secularism. This 
closure was upheld by the European Court of Human Rights in 2001 and by its Grand 
Chamber in 2003. An attempt to create another political party to replace Welfare also 
ended in similar closure in 2001. The ban in Turkish universities (and certain other 
institutions) on the use of the headscarf as a symbol of Islamic identity was implemented 
particularly in this time frame. Similar bans were imposed in a number of other 
European countries, and these bans were also upheld by the European Court.  
This policy soon gave way to an alternative concept, however. In the post-9/11 context, 
a concept of “moderate Islam” was contrasted with “radical Islam” and promoted to 
counter the threat of “terrorism.” The AKP was founded in 2001 and conceived as a role 
model of “moderate Islam” that Turkey could offer to the Muslim world. Initially claiming 
a project of correcting the alleged past “injustices” of Kemalist secularism and describing 
its own ideology as “conservative democracy,” and welcomed by the West, the AKP 
swept to power in 2002 and has remained in office to this day. But, cautious at first and 
speaking the language of democratization, the AKP gradually turned authoritarian and 
began to Islamize the state and society as it more securely entrenched itself in power 
(Özbudun, 2014; Kaya, 2015). It did so by taking advantage of the instruments at the 
state’s disposal, paradoxically associated with Kemalist secularism.  
I have elsewhere argued that Islamist-inclined governments may very well use the 
institutional instruments at the disposal of the presumably “secular” Turkish state to 
promote an Islamist agenda and that the rule of the AKP constitutes a perfect example 
in this regard (Gülalp, 2017). We may consider the case of the DIB, depicted by authors 
critical of Kemalist secularism as an instrument of the suppression of Islam in Turkey. 
The DIB continued to grow in size and extend its reach in the 1980s, during the 
hegemony of the ideology of “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis”; and especially during the AKP 
period, it turned into a powerful and prominent institution (Gözaydın, 2009). According 
to the statistics on the DIB’s official website, the number of its personnel grew roughly 
from 74,000 in 2002 to 120,000 in 2014. Its budget for 2015, as reported on the Finance 
Ministry’s website, exceeded the combined total of the budget of five cabinet ministries 
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(Ministry of Youth and Sports; Science and Technology; Forestry and Water; Customs 
and Trade; and the European Union). DIB’s functions were diversified during this period. 
In 2012, it started to run its own television channel, Diyanet TV, targeting women and 
children in particular. New projects empowered DIB representatives to directly 
intervene in community and even familial affairs in provincial neighborhoods. DIB’s 
Strategic Plan for 2012-2016, and for 2017-2021, included such strategic aims as playing 
an effective role in the solution of social problems, finding ways to prevent the moral 
degeneration of society, increasing collaboration with other Muslim nations in order to 
present to the world an “objective” image of Islam, and so on. In addition to its enormous 
size and daily involvement in social life, DIB also plays a significant political role in 
legitimizing government actions, which may take the form of public statements by the 
Director of DIB or written sermons prepared by DIB headquarters and sent to all 
mosques around the country to be read at Friday prayers.  
Finally, the AKP government passed a new law in 2010 that vastly expanded the scope 
of activities of the DIB, conferring to the organization a wide range of responsibilities in 
the realm of social and cultural life, to keep values and morals alive, and to educate the 
people in the ways of Islam regarding the economy, gender relations, and so on (Adak, 
2015; Akan, 2017, pp.239-43; Mutluer, 2018). The long list of duties enumerated in 
Article 6 of this law include “offering legal advice” on the laws, statues and regulations 
prepared by the administration, apparently bringing the DIB closer to the position of the 
office of the Şeyhülislam, as in the Ottoman Empire. Clearly, this reverses the role of the 
DIB as originally envisaged by the Kemalists, whose aim was to move toward secularism. 
The institutional structure that incorporates the religious establishment into the state, 
then, readily allows for the use of religious language for political mobilization and hence 
offers a natural advantage to Islamist political forces and movements. Political 
mobilization based on the idea that the essence of national identity is religion has been 
most effectively expressed and put into practice by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, current 
President of Turkey and leader of the AKP. He expressed his political perspective most 
succinctly in an interview back in 1993, at the beginning of his successful political career. 
He noted that democracy is a “means rather than an end,” useful only to arrive at the 
system desired by the people (Sever and Dizdar, 1993, pp.419-20). He added: “We 
believe that almost all people in Turkey, both due to their natural existence and the 
geography they live in and the historical mission they carry, are already Muslim. But they 
have been deterred from fulfilling this characteristic. They have been suppressed by 
force. If we could lift this oppression in their brains, they will naturally select Islam. For 
their essence consists of faith.” (ibid., pp.431-2). This type of identity-based politics is 
naturally authoritarian and potentially totalitarian. 
After nearly twenty years of unbroken AKP rule, however, there seems to be a societal 
backlash. Nader Hashemi (2018) describes how the top-down Islamization of society in 
Iran created the opposite trend toward secularization among the middle class, the youth, 
and civil society in general, including “negative feelings toward religion” (p.186). A 
similar process may be observed in Turkey today. Erdoğan announced in 2012 his 
intention to “raise pious generations” through the schooling system (Cengiz, 2014). The 
outcome however has been the opposite. Reports indicate a decline in religiosity and 
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rise in deism and atheism, alarming the AKP government and its religious establishment 
(Hurtas, 2019). A pamphlet prepared by the DIB and distributed to readers free of 
charge explained that there is an inverse relationship between secular education and 
religiosity, and that persons with higher levels of education tend to turn away from belief 
and worship as a result of the “questioning” and even “discriminatory attitudes” 
associated with “modernity and secularism” (Demokrat Haber, 29 January 2019). Umut 
Azak (2018) notes, however, that the recent rise in the visibility of atheism in Turkey is 
not an inevitable result of the secularist legacy of the Republic, nor a sign of 
secularization, but “a reaction to the success of Turkish Islamism” (pp.70-1). One might 
also add to this picture the growing trend among young women to shed their 
headscarves. An earlier generation of young women (and men), especially in the late 
1990s, had struggled to have the right for women to wear the headscarf in universities 
and government offices and won this right under the AKP government, first in 
universities in 2011 and then all government offices in 2013. But, now, those wearing 
headscarves either through previous choice or under family pressure, or just out of 
seeing it normalized in their natural environment and among friends, have formed 
networks where they share their decisions to remove them and offer each other support. 
The best known of these networks is a website called “Yalnız Yürümeyeceksin” 
(https://www.yalnizyurumeyeceksin.com/), meaning “you will not walk alone.” These 
trends seem to confirm the misgivings expressed early on by Kemalist secularists, that 
the uneducated may be more politically pliable through religion and that bringing 
religion down from its exalted place in the hearts and minds of people to mix it up with 
the worldly affairs of politics and the power struggles of politicians would be a disservice 
to it.  
 
Lessons of the Turkish Case 
According to Bhikhu Parekh (2017, pp.321-2), the following four conditions should be 
met for a state to be considered “secular”: (1) “the state should be autonomous in the 
sense that the source of its authority should be located within it and not in some 
transcendental principle or being,” (2) “the state should pursue objectives that all its 
citizens share independently of whether or not they are religious and of what kind,” (3) 
“the state should not establish or institutionalise a religion or require its citizens to 
belong to it as a condition of their citizenship or occupancy of a particular office,” (4) 
“the state’s decisions, policies and laws should be publicly defended and justified, and 
should be based on reasons its citizens can assess and debate.” He concludes: “A state 
that fails on any of these is to that extent not secular, and cannot attain its basic 
objectives in a religiously diverse society.” It is clear from the foregoing that, judged by 
these criteria, among which perhaps only the first one is met, the Turkish state is not and 
has never been “secular.” Given both its institutional structure and prevailing notion of 
national identity, both of which have been inherited from the Ottoman Empire, albeit 
transformed to a certain extent, it cannot serve as a good model of secularism and 
regulation of religious affairs in a diverse society.  
How do we then describe the Turkish model? Leaving aside those, already mentioned, 
who attach sensational qualifiers to Turkey’s secularism, such as oppressive, assertive 
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or even “pathological” (Kadıoğlu, 2010), a more sophisticated analysis may be found in 
Andrew Davison’s attempt to draw a careful conceptual distinction between secular and 
laicist. He argues that Turkey is not secular because complete separation has not taken 
place, but is laicist because while religion has been removed from certain areas of 
political affairs it has been retained in others through state authority. He concludes that 
secularism is therefore prevented by laicism (Davison, 2003). Though interesting, and 
overlapping with aspects of the analysis offered in this paper, this argument still does 
not provide a satisfactory answer. First of all, it is not certain that there is indeed a clear 
distinction between these two terms. The European Court of Human Rights, for instance, 
uses the terms “secularism” and “laicité” interchangeably in the English-language and 
French-language versions of their judgments. Second, if we define Turkey as “laicist” 
because the religious establishment is incorporated into the state structure through the 
DIB, as the argument goes, how do we define the Ottoman Empire, from which this 
institutional structure was inherited? Or, if we call Turkey “laicist” because the state has 
hegemony over religion and presumes to determine correct Islam through its religious 
institution, then do we also call Iran and Saudi Arabia “laicist”? Or, if we call Turkey 
“laicist” because the nation has a religious identity, and the state an established or at 
least a “preferred” religion with which the citizens are to be associated, then, again 
where do we put a whole host of other nations that have the same characteristics?  
Considering what has been said so far, the Turkish model of state-religion relations most 
closely resembles “identity-based religious majoritarianism nationalism” among the 
categories identified by Modood and Sealy (2019, p.11). The primary goal of the Kemalist 
project was to sever the ties of the individuals to their parochial (religious or ethnic) 
communities and link them up directly (as distinct individuals) with the nation-state. 
This model of nation-state building followed the “ideal-normative” French example of 
nation-building. The Ottoman state had left the “primordial” communities intact; and yet 
in its own way it was also “secular” as far as the links between political power and 
religion were concerned, but obviously not in the normative sense of providing freedom 
of conscience and religion. Indeed, secularism understood as state domination of 
religion necessarily (or at least tendentially) precludes “neutrality,” which implies 
religious pluralism and the state’s equidistance to them. The Turkish Republican model 
was not so much a question of secularism (for enlightenment or for democracy) as a 
question of creating national homogeneity.  
Perhaps, then, the focus of analysis must shift from the question of “secularism” to that 
of “equal citizenship.” The UK provides a good counter example. It has an established 
church and the head of the state is also the head of the church. Yet, one would be hard-
pressed to define the UK as anything other than “secular” in the state’s treatment of its 
citizens, despite its outward appearance as a “religious state.” The UK had “blasphemy 
laws” in its books, when the “Rushdie affair” broke out. The Muslim community 
demanded that the same prohibition also apply to blaspheming Islam, to which the state 
responded (albeit belatedly) by lifting blasphemy laws altogether. This is a good 
example of the normative respect for equal citizenship. But suppose the Muslim demand 
was met, and then another religious community demanded the same kind of protection 
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for their own sacred beliefs. Would there ever be any end to this or would the state have 
to draw a line somewhere, and, if so, where?  
The principle of freedom of religion and conscience, by definition, necessitates freedom 
from religion. The sanctity of a belief only concerns the believer. Non-believers or 
believers of other faiths have no obligation toward the faith that they do not share; they 
only have to respect the right of the believers to have the faith that they may wish to 
have. It is, in other words, a human right, the right of an individual to freedom of thought, 
belief and conscience; it is not the right or freedom of a faith or belief system to impose 
itself on others. To maintain social peace in a diverse society a secular logic must prevail 
in order to negotiate issues of common concern between believers of different faiths and 
non-believers alike. Secularism, then, entails the existence of a political space separate 
from and independent of religions for the purpose of negotiating common issues and 
areas of concern, so that the social and political needs of all religious and irreligious 
members of society may be met. 
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